Asymmetric information

Results: 1016



#Item
41Delegated Investment in a Dynamic Agency Model ∗  Florian Hoffmann† Sebastian Pfeil‡

Delegated Investment in a Dynamic Agency Model ∗ Florian Hoffmann† Sebastian Pfeil‡

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Source URL: dl.dropboxusercontent.com

Language: English
420701_CACM56.06_Star_final

0701_CACM56.06_Star_final

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Source URL: www.infosys.tuwien.ac.at

Language: English - Date: 2013-05-27 06:23:41
43Received 10 May 2004 Accepted 16 June 2004 Published online 25 October 2004 The disadvantage of combinatorial communication 

Received 10 May 2004 Accepted 16 June 2004 Published online 25 October 2004 The disadvantage of combinatorial communication 

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Source URL: octavia.zoology.washington.edu

Language: English - Date: 2004-11-24 18:39:07
44Exit Options in Incomplete Contracts with Asymmetric Information∗ Helmut Bester†and Daniel Kr¨ahmer‡ March 28, 2012  Abstract

Exit Options in Incomplete Contracts with Asymmetric Information∗ Helmut Bester†and Daniel Kr¨ahmer‡ March 28, 2012 Abstract

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Source URL: www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de

Language: English - Date: 2012-03-28 07:36:54
45Trust and Moral Hazard: An Analysis of the Motorcycle-taxi Market in Togo and Benin∗ Moussa P. Blimpo SIEPR, Stanford University 366 Galvez Street, Room 222 Stanford, CA 94305

Trust and Moral Hazard: An Analysis of the Motorcycle-taxi Market in Togo and Benin∗ Moussa P. Blimpo SIEPR, Stanford University 366 Galvez Street, Room 222 Stanford, CA 94305

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Source URL: afea.info

Language: English - Date: 2013-03-31 00:58:05
46On the First-Order Approach in Principal-Agent Models with Hidden Borrowing and Lending Árpád Ábrahám,ySebastian Koehne,z and Nicola Pavoni x DecemberAbstract

On the First-Order Approach in Principal-Agent Models with Hidden Borrowing and Lending Árpád Ábrahám,ySebastian Koehne,z and Nicola Pavoni x DecemberAbstract

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Source URL: apps.eui.eu

Language: English - Date: 2011-02-21 08:52:52
47RAND Journal of Economics Vol. 46, No. 1, Spring 2015 pp. 165–185 Investing in a relationship Marina Halac∗

RAND Journal of Economics Vol. 46, No. 1, Spring 2015 pp. 165–185 Investing in a relationship Marina Halac∗

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Source URL: www0.gsb.columbia.edu

Language: English - Date: 2015-01-29 10:05:07
48Deferred compensation and risk-taking incentives∗ Florian Hoffmann† Roman Inderst‡  Marcus Opp§

Deferred compensation and risk-taking incentives∗ Florian Hoffmann† Roman Inderst‡ Marcus Opp§

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Source URL: dl.dropboxusercontent.com

Language: English
49THE EFFICIENT ALLOCATION OF CONSUMPTION UNDER MORAL HAZARD AND HIDDEN ACCESS TO THE CREDIT MARKET Arpad Abraham Duke University

THE EFFICIENT ALLOCATION OF CONSUMPTION UNDER MORAL HAZARD AND HIDDEN ACCESS TO THE CREDIT MARKET Arpad Abraham Duke University

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Source URL: apps.eui.eu

Language: English - Date: 2011-02-21 09:09:05
50Honest signalling with costly gambles Frazer Meacham1, Aaron Perlmutter1 and Carl T. Bergstrom1,Department of Biology, University of Washington, PO Box, Seattle, WA 98195, USA

Honest signalling with costly gambles Frazer Meacham1, Aaron Perlmutter1 and Carl T. Bergstrom1,Department of Biology, University of Washington, PO Box, Seattle, WA 98195, USA

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Source URL: octavia.zoology.washington.edu

Language: English - Date: 2013-08-01 12:15:25